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Over the last few decades, work in affective neuroscience has increasingly investigated the 
neural basis of emotion. A central debate in the field, when studying individuals with brain 
damage, has been whether emotional processes are lateralized or not. This review aims to 
expand this debate, by considering the need to include a hierarchical dimension to the 
problem. The historical journey of these diverse literatures is presented, particularly focusing 
on the need to develop a research program that explores the neural basis of a wide range of 
emotional processes (perception, expression, experience, regulation, decision making, etc.), 
and also its relation to lateralized cortical and deep-subcortical brain structures. Of especial 
interest is the study of the interaction between emotional components, for example, between 
emotion generation and emotion regulation. Finally, emerging evidence from lesion studies 
is presented regarding the neural basis of emotion regulation strategies, where the issue of 
laterality seems most relevant. It is proposed that, because emotion regulation strategies are 
complex higher order cognitive processes, the question appears to be not the lateralization 
of the entire emotional process, but the lateralization of the specific cognitive tools we use to 
manage our feelings, in a range of different ways.  
 
Key words: emotion; emotion regulation; process model of emotion regulation; 
reappraisal, suppression; laterality. 
 
“Neuropsychology is still a very young science, 
taking its very first steps, and a period of thirty 
years is not a very long time for the development 
of any science. That is why some very important 
chapters, such as motives, complex forms of 
emotions and the structure of personality are not 
included in this book. Perhaps they will be added 
in future editions?” 
Aleksandr Luria (1973) The Working Brain. An 





For more than half a century, there has been a debate in neuropsychology on the issue of 
hemispheric asymmetry in emotion, linked to a broader discussion about the role of cortical 
brain regions in emotion. The debate has brought data from a wide range of sources: most 
notably human lesion work (Borod et al., 2000, 2002) and electrical stimulation work in non-
human animals (Panksepp, 1998, Turnbull & Bar, 2020). A key issue in the debate has been 
whether there is hemispheric asymmetry in the way that the brain processes emotional 
information in general, a broad question that can be interpreted in several ways. After 
extensive investigation and discussion, the field now appears to have some resolution to this 
larger issue. Essentially, there is evidence for hemispheric asymmetry in some elements of 
emotional life, but not in others. Indeed, the cortex itself is clearly important only for some 
elements of the broad phenomenon of emotion, for example the way that emotions are 
perceived and expressed, which often show strong effects of hemispheric asymmetry. As we 
discuss below, there is also an emergent literature describing laterality effects in emotion 
regulation, closely linked to specific neuropsychological skills. On the other hand, the role of 
deep subcortical structures in the generation of emotion has become increasingly clear, 
particularly as regards the experience of powerful feelings, or affect (Damasio & Carvalho, 
2013; Panksepp, 1998). 
This paper reviews the historical journey of these diverse literatures, particularly focusing on 
the neglected issue of how we manage our emotions, a topic of great importance for mental 
health and psychopathology. The paper also reviews the status of various emotion 
regulation strategies, and the extent to which their neural basis is understood, and proposes 
three ways in which the field might productively move forward in the future.  Our main goal is 
to expand the limits of the debate regarding emotion and hemispheric asymmetry, pointing to 
an important but poorly understood emotional process, emotion regulation. 
 
2. The Laterality Hypothesis: perception, expression and experience 
The early years of neuropsychological research on emotion were dominated by tasks of 
emotion perception, and findings on the role of hemispheric asymmetry in people with 
unilateral brain lesions (see Borod, 2000 for review). Examples included the role of the right 
hemisphere in the control of prosody (the intonation and affective aspects that form the 
'music' of speech), and which so dominates the vocal interactions of mothers and babies 
(Fifer & Moon, 1994; Glanville et al, 1977). There were, for example, related findings of a left 
ear advantage for the detection of auditory affect, with tasks such as dichotic listening 
showing strong laterality effects in differentiating (say) between 'sad' versus 'happy' versions 
of the same sentence (e.g. Bryden et al., 1991; Herrero & Hillix, 1990, Shipley-Brown et al., 
1988, Turnbull et al, 2001).  
An independent strand of research looked at how brain damage could alter the experience of 
emotion in survivors, and explore the underlying neural and psychological mechanisms. This 
was particularly studied in patients with denial of deficit (anosognosia), after right-sided brain 
lesions. These patients often did not show the negative emotional responses to their paresis 
that one might expect. Most notably, they had fewer episodes of tearfulness and emotional 
breakdown (so-called ‘catastrophic’ reactions) than those with left hemisphere lesions 
(Fedoroff et al., 1992; House et al., 1990; Gainotti, 1972; 1997; Robinson and Jorge, 1994). 
These patients were often not merely unaware of their deficits, but were sometimes 
unnecessarily optimistic about their medical condition (i.e. ‘euphoric-maniacal’, Gainotti, 
1997).  
The observation and study of these patients was a cornerstone in the development of one 
laterality hypothesis, suggesting that the ‘absence’ of negative emotions after right 
hemisphere damage was related to the impairment of a system specialized in processing 
emotions of this valence. Evidence from studies looking at the effects of right-sided intra-
carotid amobarbital supported the hypothesis. This procedure often produced some degree 
of anosognosia (Brier, 1995; Lu et al., 1997, Meador et al., 2000), long reported to differ from 
the more emotionally appropriate outcomes that followed from left-sided amobarbital 
(Gainotti, 1972, see Feinberg, 1997 for review). A further strand of this line of evidence 
focussed on the role of the right-hemisphere in the higher aspects of homeostasis, somato-
sensory representation, and emotion regulation (Damasio, 1994 pp.62-69; 1999 pp. 209-
213; 1996). 
This pattern of findings led to hemispheric accounts of emotion, of which the best known is 
that of Davidson and colleagues (Davidson, 2001; Davidson and Irwin, 1999). This is the 
suggestion of a right frontal system involved in negative (withdrawal-related) emotional 
states, with left frontal regions associated with positive (approach-related) emotion. Thus, 
Davidson interpreted depressive reactions in brain-injured patients with left-sided lesions as 
the result of a disruption of a (left-sided) positive emotion system (e.g. Davidson and Irwin, 
1999, p.13). In contrast, anosognosia would result from a disruption of a negative emotional 
system (right-sided), leaving the patient with only a (left-sided) positive emotion system.  
 
3. Anosognosia as the ‘absence’ of emotion?  
There are various limitations to this prototype hemispheric asymmetry model of anosognosia 
(see Turnbull et al, 2014 for a review). The first is that it fails to account for various forms of 
emotional complexity in the neurological patient group, including emotion selectivity, and 
variability across time. For example, a disruption of negative emotions would explain only the 
absence of emotion in relation to paresis in patients, not why patients might actively deny 
their paresis (Marcel et al, 2004). Also (see Gainotti, 1997 for review) the low mood seen in 
patients with left-sided lesions is likely to result from an emotionally-appropriate response to 
their substantial levels of disability, which typically involves hemiparesis and non-fluent 
aphasia. 
Research on emotion and laterality has also neglected the dynamic character of emotion, 
particularly emotional experience. During development, human beings learn to manage 
feelings, particularly painful ones, either using automatic or cognitively-controlled regulatory 
strategies (Posner & Rothbart; 2000; Thompson, 2011). Thus, emotional experience, or 
emotion generation, cannot be separated from emotion regulation (McRae et al., 2012), 
posing important methodological challenges. This fluctuating element is seen in patients with 
frontal lesions where, due to impairments in cognitive control, the dynamics of emotional 
experience change substantially (eg. rise time, magnitude, decay rate; see Salas et al., 
2013; 2014).  
Perhaps an even more complicated question is whether we can even speak of an ‘absence’ 
of emotion after brain injury. This approach is heavily influenced by how neurology and 
neuropsychology have historically portrayed cognitive impairments, offering (correctly) 
accounts of functions that are genuinely lost: a-phasia, a-praxia, a-mnesia etc. But emotions 
are not abolished after brain damage. Studies exploring emotional changes after unilateral 
lesions often report a disruption of specific emotional processes, but not their complete 
collapse or absence. There are, of course, rare cases where the processing of a specific 
emotion can be heavily compromised in all modalities, of which the best known is fear, after 
bilateral damage to the amygdala; Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio & Damasio, 1994; Feinstein, 
Adolphs, Damasio & Tranel, 2011). But, even in these cases, the loss is not complete, and 
certainly does not produce an absence of emotional life – not least because other negative 
emotions are preserved in experience. Case studies that report a preservation of emotional 
life after extensive bilateral damage to the limbic system support this point, suggesting that 
neither cortical nor subcortical damage can completely abolish emotional experience 
(Feinstein, 2013; Feinstein et al., 2010). Indeed, data from children with hydranencephalic 
brains, and non-human animals where the cortex is removed, suggest that the cortex is 
certainly not the neural substrate of emotional experience, since emotional experience in 
these cases is preserved and even amplified (Houston & Borbely, 1973, 1974; Merker, 2007, 
Turnbull & Bar, 2020). Only deep subcortical lesions, especially to the upper brain stem, 
appear to completely abolish emotional experience, but in this case because of a complete 
loss of consciousness (Parvizi & Damasio, 2003).  
There is a further observation that runs counter to the ‘anosognosia as a loss of negative 
emotions’ account. These are circumstances when right-sided lesions produced an increase, 
rather than a disruption, in negative emotion (again, Turnbull et al, 2014 for review). For 
example, the finding of explicit dislike or obsessional hatred of the paretic limb (‘misoplegia’, 
Critchley, 1974, Moss & Turnbull, 1996) seen after right-sided lesions, which is discordant 
with a loss-of-negative-emotions account. These cases often involve damage to right frontal 
areas of cortex, and several authors have suggested that inhibitory failures contribute to this 
florid presentation (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Feinberg, 2011). Finally, there have 
been reports of frank depression after right fronto-parietal lesions in patients who were also 
anosognosic (e.g. Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Starkstein et al., 1990; Turnbull et al., 
2002).  
Linked to this, but less cited, are fluctuations in emotion, and awareness of deficit, seen in 
some anosognosic patients. For example, transient recovery of awareness after caloric 
irrigation has been reported by various authors (Cappa et al., 1987; Ramachandran, 1994; 
1996; Rode et al., 1998; Vallar et al., 1990). It is of interest that, in at least some of these 
cases, patients often had a selective failure to recall their (earlier acknowledged) paresis 
when they had returned to their anosognosic state. Finally, there have been several reports 
of patients who experienced transient awareness of their deficit, including “sudden moments 
of tearfulness and pre-tearfulness" (Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000, p.166) which appeared 
to be preceded by themes of loss (c.f. Moss & Turnbull, 1996, Ross & Rush, 1981, 
Starkstein et al, 1988, Turnbull et al., 2002, 2005). This suggests that negative emotions 
may be intact in at least some instances of anosognosia, appearing only under some 
circumstances, presumably shaped by cognitive impairments and other dynamic factors 
which produce variation in emotion in all humans. 
As regards the emotional consequences of ideas, we have reported several instances of 
preservation of negative emotional states, including the full range of emotional experience, in 
anosognosic patients with right sided-lesions (see Turnbull & Salas, 2017 for review). An 
interesting element of these emotional states was their selective nature. For example, a 
tendency to produce the same magnitude of emotion as controls, but for this to be directed 
at an external object, rather than towards the self, thus suggesting the influence of dynamic 
or regulatory variables (Fotopoulou, 2007a, 2007b; Turnbull et al., 2002, 2004, see Turnbull 
& Salas, 2017).  
A productive explanation of this unusual response is the active influence of some form of 
psychological defence. On this argument, real-world evidence requires the patient to 
(consciously) face the existence of their disabling hemiparesis. This triggers powerful 
feelings of sadness and loss, which are difficult to tolerate. To protect the self from such 
unmanaged and powerful emotions, the patient produces one or other form of defence 
(repression, rationalisation etc., c.f. Anderson and Green, 2001, Nardone et al, 2006). 
Defences are, of course, imperfect solutions to protection, so that the patient will at times be 
unable to avoid feelings of loss, thus explaining the fluctuating nature of the patient’s 
emotional state. Arguments of this type have previously been proposed (Goldstein, 1939; 
Schilder, 1935; Weinstein, 1991; Weinstein and Kahn, 1955), and have been revived in the 
neuroscientific literature more recently, suggesting that anosognosia might indeed be a form 
of defence (Marcel et al., 2004; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; Ramachandran, 1996; 
Turnbull et al., 2002, 2014, see Turnbull & Salas, 2017 for review). Notably, in the applied 
field of neuropsychological rehabilitation, it is well-established that the clinical presentation of 
anosognosic patients is a mixture of organic and psychological (defensive) factors (Ben-
Yishay & Diller, 2011; Prigatano, 1999; Klonoff, 2010). 
In sum, we have a field which suggests that emotional experience is somehow preserved 
after cortical lesions, but is also distorted or altered, in various ways. Explaining this paradox 
requires firstly that we identify a source of emotion generation which is outside the cortex, 
and secondly to identify the contribution of neuropsychological components that produce the 
distortion in emotional processes. Emerging evidence suggests that the source of emotion 
generation lies in a range of deep subcortical structures, of which the most important is in 
the upper brain stem. In contrast, the cause of the distortion appears a range of cortical 
areas devoted to managing feelings and other higher cognitive processes. The basis for 
these assertions is reviewed below.  
 
4. The brain basis of emotion generation 
As suggested above, there has been a long-standing debate in neuropsychology on the 
brain basis of emotion. The alternatives are not merely laterality within the cortex, but the 
question of whether the basis of emotion generation is itself subcortical. On this anatomical 
issue, which we might include nuclei such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and even 
archicortical structures such as the insula (for details on the likely role of these discrete 
structures in this system to different aspects of emotion, see Turnbull & Bar, 2020 pp.6-8). 
Critically, this debate also includes deep subcortical structures, such as the hypothalamus, 
and indeed the upper brain stem, most notably the peri-aqueductal gray (PAG). In part, this 
debate flourished because the relevant literatures were separated for many decades, 
notably between human lesion neuropsychology, and stimulation work on non-human 
animals. However, after decades of work, there are several strands of evidence suggesting 
that the cortex is not be the basis of core emotional experience (see Turnbull & Bar, 2020, or 
Solms 2020 for a readable review of this literature).   
Firstly, as touched on above, it has become clear that cortical lesions do not disrupt the 
ability to generate emotional experiences. Such cortical lesions clearly produce any number 
of distortions to the emotional lives of neurological patients. These represent a change in the 
emotional ‘landscape’ (as we might call it): such as an increased threshold to trigger 
emotional reactions (Gainotti, 1997), inappropriately positive responses to hemiparesis 
(Gainotti, 1972; 1997), failure to correctly interpret emotions (Borod, 2000), disinhibition of 
emotional responses (Harlow, 1848), incorrect use of emotion for decision-making 
(Damasio, 1996), or failure to appropriately regulate emotions (Salas et al, 2019). However, 
these cortically-lesioned patients preserve the full range of emotional experience: from 
happiness through anger (see Turnbull & Salas, 2017 for review). This literature has 
increasingly suggested that the source of emotional experience is deeply subcortical: the 
‘Hidden Spring’ referred to in the Solms (2020) book title. 
A parallel research strand has long identified many subcortical emotion-related brain areas: 
such as the amygdala, insula, hypothalamus, and anterior cingulate (see, for example, 
LeDoux, 2003, Craig, 2011, Bush et al., 2000, Turnbull et al, 2014). These seem critical for 
other elements of emotional life, such as emotion-memory (LeDoux, 2003), the integration of 
internally-generated experienced states with externally-facing senses (Craig, 2011), or the 
role of loss in decision-making (Bush et al., 2000). However, as described above, lesion to 
these subcortical sites do not obliterate the emotional experience itself (e.g. Damasio et al, 
2012). Instead, the core of emotional experience appears to closely tied to systems 
underpinning consciousness, in the dorsal regions of the mid-brain (Solms, 2013, 2020, 
Turnbull & Bar, 2020), especially the PAG (Panksepp, 1998). In part, this conclusion is based 
on evidence that all the primary emotion systems (which include the various subcortical 
regions named above) terminate in the PAG. In addition, it is in the PAG that one appears to 
find the maximal emotional outcome (pleasurable or aversive) for the smallest electrical 
current (Panksepp, 1998). Stimulation of amygdala, insula, hypothalamus or anterior 
cingulate produce fewer substantial effects (Panksepp, 1998), and lesion to those brain 
areas produce some, but not overwhelming, changes in global emotional experience 
(Damasio, Damasio & Tranel, 2012; Salas et al., 2014; 2015; 2016; Turnbull et al, 2005). 
 
This subcortical source is not the central goal of this review, but it provides much-needed 
context for understanding the hierarchical organization of emotional life, in all its potential 
complexity. Critically, this expands the debate on the neural basis of emotion beyond the 
problem of hemispheric asymmetry, to the ‘vertical’ dimension of hierarchy. In evolutionary 
terms, these higher order cognitive functions have emerged not only to help us successfully 
deal with demands from the external world, but most importantly to successfully manage 
internal states of the body (the internal world) in the light of contextual constraints: to 
manage feelings in an adaptive fashion, in the light of environmental and social limitations 
(Solms, 2020). These tools allow us to use emotions to fuel and direct behaviour, to inhibit 
emotional responses when they are not adequate to our long-term goals, to predict the 
future based in relevant past experiences, and to read or hide emotional expressions when 
necessary.  
We now further develop this idea, with a focus on the concept of emotion regulation, a 
complex higher-order psychological process, that has been defined as a mechanism to 
manage elementary emotional experiences. Below, we describe emerging evidence 
regarding the neuropsychological and neuroanatomical basis of different emotion regulation 
strategies, paying special attention to issues of laterality. 
 
5. Emotion regulation 
A critical distinction in neuropsychology has been the difference between having feelings 
(emotion generation) and successfully managing those feelings (emotion regulation).  For 
well over a century, neuropsychologists have noted that brain injury can change the ability to 
manage feelings (see Salas et al, 2019 for review). The Phineas Gage case (Harlow, 1868) 
is a commonly cited early example, reporting that the “balance” between Gage’s intellectual 
faculties and his “animal propensities” had been disrupted. Hughlings Jackson also 
described the phenomenon as one of alteration of ‘balance’ between cognition and emotion 
(Jackson, 1888, p.113). The modern literature usually defines these regulation skills as 
involving a wide set of processes, by which we influence which emotions we have, when we 
have them, and how they are experienced and expressed (Gross, 2014). Outside the field of 
neuropsychology, emotion regulation has been a popular research topic only in the last few 
decades, and is increasingly linked to a remarkably wide range of mental health disorders 
(Gross & Jazaieri, 2014; King & Sloan, 2009; Sheppes, Suri & Gross, 2015).  
Despite the clinical importance of disorders of emotion regulation, the field was relatively 
under-investigated in neuropsychology for many decades (Beer and Lombardo, 2007). For 
example, from 1990 to 2016, only 41 articles were published (roughly 1.5 per annum) that 
directly addressed the problem of emotion regulation after brain damage (Salas et al, 2019). 
However, the few years have seen considerable progress in understanding the 
neurobiological basis of emotion regulation, and in linking this to a robust theoretical 
framework, namely the well-established Process Model of Emotion Regulation (Gross, 
2014). This model proposes that human beings manage feelings (in a range of ways, from 
voluntarily to automatic) by using a wide range of regulatory strategies, which depend on 
diverse neuropsychological functions. These are: situation selection, situation modification, 
attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. There has been limited 
investigation of these in neurological populations, and the available evidence is not 
conclusive regarding laterality effects. Nevertheless, the field is progressively offering more 
clarity on the issue, and the model offers fertile ground to systematically explore hemispheric 
asymmetries in the regulation of affect.  
5.1. Situation selection is a strongly antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy. It has 
often been described as taking action to avoid/ensure future situations that will produce 
desirable emotional outcomes, or as the ability to predict the trajectory of emotional 
experience into the future (Werner & Gross, 2010). An example, sometimes suggested by 
patients, would be choosing not to go food shopping at a busy time, because this has been 
stressful in the past. Recent studies have proposed that situation selection might be a 
particularly useful strategy for those that struggle to manage feelings in the moment (Webb 
et al., 2017). The number of studies exploring this strategy is small and there are, as yet, no 
robust experimental paradigms (Livingstone & Isaaccowitz, 2915; Markovitch, Netzer & 
Tamir, 2017; Sands & Isaacowitz, 2017).  
Despite its conceptual relevance, and obvious links with mental health problems and 
emotional difficulties commonly presented by neurological patients, situation selection 
remains largely under-investigated. It is of particular interest that situation selection appears 
to depend on two neuropsychological processes: a) the capacity to generate an array of 
hypothetical future scenarios and b) the ability to decide among them based on their 
potential emotional impact (Salas, Turnbull & Gross, 2019). Two groups of neurological 
patients are particularly relevant here. It has been reported that individuals with severe 
episodic amnesia due to bilateral hippocampal damage (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & 
Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002), and individuals with emotion-based  
decision problems after damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex (Fellows & Farah, 2005), 
present an impaired performance in tasks that require imagining, and deciding amongst, 
future scenarios (so-called mental time travel). Regarding laterality effects, none of the 
above-mentioned studies offered data to address this question systematically. 
5.2. Situation modification is a further antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategy, 
closer in time to the emotional event. Situation modification occurs in the present moment or 
immediate future, demanding individuals to rapidly and flexibly generate alternative actions 
that may change the course of a situation (Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2019). For example, 
taking a break from a social situation, such as a group conversation, that is becoming 
increasingly difficult. Amongst all emotion regulation strategies, situation modification is the 
least understood (Livingstone & Isaacowitz, 2015). However, its definition maps into classic 
conceptualizations of problem solving. We know that a wide range of neuropsychological 
impairments can compromise problem solving, particularly executive dysfunction. Here, the 
work of Stuss and colleagues have offered important evidence regarding laterality effects in 
this regard. Using lesion data, he has proposed a model of executive function where the left 
lateral PFC cortex is specialized in task setting and cognitive flexibility, while the right lateral 
PFC specializes in monitoring behaviour and detecting errors (BA 44, 45, 46, 9, 9/46, and 
47/12, Stuss & Alexander, 2007). There is some evidence suggesting that individuals with 
task setting impairments after left PFC lesions struggle regulating negative feelings, 
presenting with a tendency to become stuck (to perseverate) in negative emotional states 
(Salas et al., 2014).  We are not aware of data regarding emotion regulation problems in 
people with lesions to the right lateral PFC. However, monitoring impairments are a cardinal 
feature of patients with anosognosia (Turnbull et al, 2014). 
5.3 Attentional deployment involves regulating emotion by changing the focus of attention, 
moving it away from an aversive object or thought or switching the focus towards a more 
neutral or positively valenced object or thought. Attentional deployment has been described 
as an internal version of situation selection (Werner & Gross, 2010). An example might be 
choosing to focus on a relaxing and uplifting hobby, rather than ruminating on a recent life-
event which has gone badly. Early during development, and due to the maturation of 
attentional networks, children learn to redirect attention as a means to regulate negative 
feelings (Rothbart, Ziaie & O`Boyle 1992). Indeed, the experimental study of attentional 
deployment is a new and small field, and authors have suggested that this strategy relies on 
several attentional abilities, such as the capacity to sustain attention (Urry & Gross 2010), to 
detach the attentional focus from negative stimuli (Rothbarth, Ziaie & O`Boyle 1992; 
Compton 2000) and to inhibit the access of negative material to working memory (Zetsche, 
Bürkner & Schulze 2018). Neuroimaging studies looking at attentional deployment / 
distraction have supported these claims, reporting an increase in activation of fronto-parietal 
networks related to attentional and inhibitory control (Ferri, Schmiddt, Hajcak & Canli, 2013; 
Kanske et al., 2010). No clear laterality effects have been reported in these studies. 
Historically, however, the right hemisphere has been described as particularly relevant for 
many attentional processes (Petersen & Posner, 2012). Furthermore, lesions to the right 
hemisphere generate the most frequent and disruptive attentional deficits (Leclercq, 
Deloche, & Rousseaux, 2002), while damage to the right PFC has long been known to 
produce an increase in distractibility (Woods & Knight, 1986). In consequence, there is good 
evidence, and theoretical arguments, to justify the need to systematically explore the 
relationship between right hemisphere damage, attentional impairments, and the effective 
use of attentional deployment.  
5.4 Cognitive Change broadly refers to the use of verbal thinking to change one’s emotions. 
It includes by far the best-researched emotion regulation strategy, namely reappraisal. 
Reappraisal has been defined as changing a situation’s meaning to alter its emotional 
impact (Gross & Thompson, 2007), usually by reframing the meaning of an aversive event in 
less negative or more positive terms (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 
2007). An example might be reframing a relationship break-up, by considering the ways in 
which you might be better off without your (now ex) partner. Reappraisal has been defined 
as a complex multi-step process, requiring several neuropsychological components: working 
memory, inhibition, verbal fluency and set shifting (Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2019). In the 
largest and most complete meta-analysis of reappraisal studies, Buhle and colleagues 
(2013) reported that the implementation of this strategy consistently modulated the 
amygdala bilaterally, and activated cognitive control regions (dmPFC, dlPFC, vlPFC and 
posterior parietal lobe). Of interest to this paper, the authors also described the recruitment 
of left posterior temporal regions, often implicated in interpreting actions, reflecting on 
intentions and extracting semantic meaning.  
Studies of brain injured survivors have been a useful source of data to understand the neural 
basis of reappraisal and its neuropsychological components. In a group study exploring 
reappraisal generation amongst individuals with unilateral lesions, no laterality effects were 
found, though there were significant differences between people with and without brain 
damage (Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, 2014). In the same study, we reported that measures of 
inhibition and verbal fluency were predictors of performance in the reappraisal generation 
task. As regards anatomy, reappraisal impairments have been regularly described in case 
studies of individuals with a range of left PFC lesions, consistent with the association 
between reappraisal and verbal thinking (Salas, Gross, Rafal, Vinas-Guasch, & Turnbull, 
2013; Salas, Vaughan, Shanker, & Turnbull, 2013).  
5.5 Response modulation refers to the attempts to influence emotional experience once it 
has been elicited (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Two classes of strategy have 
been proposed to subserve this modulatory skill: suppression and amplification. Suppression 
is the best researched response modulation strategy. It refers to the inhibition of one’s own 
emotional expressive behaviour, and is commonly assessed by asking people to watch 
videos that elicit emotional responses while instructing them to hide their facial expressions. 
The classic example real-world is that of masked schadenfreude, where it is socially helpful 
to hide your pleasure in another person’s failure. It has been proposed that suppression 
requires motor control of facial muscles, response inhibition to withhold a behavioural display 
triggered by a feeling, and interoceptive/emotional awareness to monitor and adjust the body 
(Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2019). Neuroimaging studies have supported this model, reporting 
both dynamic and structural differences in brain areas classically related to interoception, 
emotional awareness and inhibition. Abler, Hofer & Viviani (2007) reported a positive 
correlation between suppression as an emotion regulation style and resting state brain 
perfusion in the vmPFC (BA 10 and 32). Ohira and colleagues (2006) described rCBF 
increase in the left lPFC (BA 11), mPFC (BA 32) and mOFC (BA 11) during an emotional 
suppression task. Goldin and colleagues also reported activation of different PFC regions 
during a suppression task (right vlPFC, dmPFC and dlPFC). Studies looking at structural 
differences have described that individuals that use suppression frequently present larger 
grey matter volume in the dmPFC (Hermann et al., 2014; Kuhn, Gallinat & Brass, 2011) and 
insula (Giuliani, Drabant, Bhatnagar & Gross, 2011).  
Many findings suggest a bilateral involvement of PFC structures, but evidence to support 
laterality effects is mixed. To our knowledge there is only one study that has explored the 
neural basis of suppression in brain injured survivors with focal lesions. Salas and 
colleagues (2016) used a classic response modulation paradigm to test whether right PFC 
damage (commonly linked with inhibition impairments) was associated with emotion 
dysregulation. Compared to healthy controls, the rPFC group exhibited a reduced range of 
response modulation: they suppressed and amplified less. Performance on the suppression 
task was positively associated with suppression usage in everyday life, and motor inhibition 
ability. Using lesion mapping methods, lesion sites of survivors with and without impairment 
in the suppression task were contrasted, showing that damage to the right posterior insula 
was the primary common feature of the impaired subgroup.   
In sum, there is a small, but rapidly growing, literature on the brain basis of emotion 
regulation. Neuroimaging studies with neurotypical subjects have offered relevant insights, 
but they are limited in establishing the causal role of this association (see Bub, 2000). 
Research programs such as Damasio and colleagues on the role of the vmPFC in decision 
making are a clear example of the benefits of a multi-method approach (Adolphs, 2007). 
Lesion studies can greatly contribute to this endeavour, and complement neuroimaging data, 
since they allow us to explore how damage to discrete brain areas are related to specific 
changes in cognition, emotion and indeed behaviour. The in-depth study of patients with 
focal lesions also allows us to capture the subjective experience of those changes, 
addressing the difficult-to-tackle first and third person perspective problem in neuroscience 
(Salas, Casassus & Turnbull, 2017). Importantly, patients with focal lesions can be observed 
and studied in natural settings, where emotion is at its most powerful, and where emotion 
regulation is most needed (eg. Feinstein, Adolphs, Damasio & Tranel, 2011). Thus, the field 
is clearly making progress, but there are many opportunities for improvement, especially as 
regards integration across methods, and especially in better establishing the role of 
particular psychological abilities.  
As one might expect for such an evolutionarily-critical skill, emotion regulation relies on a 
number of foundational cognitive abilities, and distributed across wide range of brain areas. 
In classic neuropsychological terms, emotion regulation is a higher cortical function, that 
depends on the concerted work of widespread cortical, subcortical and deep subcortical 
brain areas (Luria, 1966). This suggests that we should not only consider the historically 
relevant question of hemispheric laterality, but also the contribution of specific cognitive skills 
and brain regions. Thus far, there is emerging evidence to support the link between 
particular emotion regulation strategies (e.g. reappraisal and suppression) and well-known 
basic neuropsychological processes (e.g. inhibition, and verbal fluency). There are strong 
theoretical arguments to assume that other less-studied emotion regulation strategies, such 
as situation selection and attention deployment, also rely on basic neuropsychological 
processes (e.g. episodic future thinking and attentional control). This a clear limitation for the 
field, but also one that can be remedied by additional work, of the sort that has been 
successful with other strategies (see Salas, Gross & Turnbull, 2019 for review). 
Evidence from neuroimaging studies also supports the key role of prefrontal structures in 
reappraisal and suppression. However, most studies describe bilateral activation of these 
structures, with few reports describing laterality effects. This is no surprise, if we keep in 
mind that emotion regulation strategies are complex, higher order, mental processes, widely 
distributed and highly dependent on several basic neuropsychological functions. As regards 
this limitation, we feel that that the study of hemispheric asymmetries in emotion regulation 
strategies should focus on the lateralization of the basic component psychological skills, and 
not on the (more complex) emotion regulation strategies themselves. For example: 
language, verbal thinking and set shifting, which are functions commonly associated to the 
left lateral convexity, are particularly relevant for reappraisal. Similarly, behavioural inhibition 
and emotional awareness, frequently associated with the right hemisphere, will be 
particularly relevant for emotional suppression. In other words, when studying the neural 
basis of emotion regulation, the relevant question appears to be not the lateralization of the 
whole process, but the lateralization of the specific cognitive tools we use to manage 
feelings in different ways.  
 
6. Discussion: Three aspirations  
What then are we to make of the current state of our understanding of how we regulate 
feelings, and the neural basis of this process? Firstly, it is now clear that the core of 
emotional experience is closely tied to evolutionarily ancient brain systems underpinning 
consciousness, in the upper brain stem and associated subcortical structures. A range of 
complex cognitive processes have emerged to help mammals and other vertebrates manage 
these basic emotional states, in the context of environmental and social constraints (e.g. 
attaching emotional valence to future events, supressing or amplifying emotions, using 
emotions to frame decisions). Our review has focussed on emotion regulation, which 
represents a diverse set of cognitive control systems to manage these elementary emotional 
experiences. Given the diversity of psychological processes that we can use to regulate 
feelings, we find that a diverse set of brain regions are necessary to support this process. 
These are widely distributed, and suggest hemispheric asymmetry consistent with the 
lateralization of the basic cognitive processes they rely upon. 
With this perspective in mind, we offer three aspirations for the field over the next decade or 
two. Each is achievable, but of course requires a concerted effort – though fortunately the 
field has been steadily growing in size and influence. 
Firstly, the field needs a more comprehensive model of emotion. There are well developed 
elements of emotion science that deal with (say) the experience/generation, perception/ 
expression, memory and regulation of emotion. Clearly, these elements operate 
simultaneously, to try and understand the rounded and complex phenomenon that is 
emotion. However, research on the specific components operates in largely independent 
silos. Again, brain injured patients offer examples to prove that these theoretical silos are 
artificial constructs. Take, for example, the issue of emotion regulation and emotional 
reactivity/generation. Both processes tend to be studied separately, despite authors claiming 
that they are strongly intertwined (McRae et al., 2012). It has been widely reported that 
lesions, particularly to the frontal cortex, can generate an increase in the intensity and 
magnitude of the emotional response, and a decreased ability to regulate feelings, often 
referred to as emotional lability, impulsivity or increased irritability. Here as noted by 
Jackson, over a century ago, damage of areas related to cognitive control lower the 
threshold of emotional reactivity, the well-known ‘short fuse’ phenomenon that our patients 
often report. Similarly, patients with damage to brain areas related to the energization 
system present a decrease in emotional reactivity, in the form of flat affect, apathy or abulia 
(Stuss & Alexander, 2007). In these cases, the threshold to produce an emotional response 
is too high, so that the down-regulation of emotion is less required, and the amplification of 
emotion is too taxing. Thus, one key aspiration for the field would be to develop a more solid 
suite of studies devoted to the interaction between the emotional drivers and the various 
cognitive components seeking to regulate them.  
Secondly, as regards emotion regulation itself, and the issue of laterality, there is a clear 
need for the field to be more systematic. As discussed above, some emotion regulation 
strategies, such as reappraisal and response modulation, have been appropriately 
investigated after focal brain lesion, using well-designed experimental tasks and self-report. 
This research has identified which neuropsychological processes might underpin each 
strategy, and it has also shown that there are substantial differences in the brain regions that 
underpin the strategies. However, the Process Model identifies a wide range of strategies to 
achieve emotion regulation. As we review above, other relevant emotion regulation 
strategies, such as situation selection and attentional deployment, do not have well designed 
experimental tasks, and/or have not been investigated in patients with neurological lesions. 
Here our efforts should aim at firstly developing the right tools to explore these processes. 
Insight from neuropsychology itself could prove valuable, since tasks designed to assess 
specific neuropsychological components could be modified to measure emotion regulation 
strategies. The case of episodic future thinking is here a paradigmatic example, with several 
studies proposing experimental designs to tap this ability (Bertossi et al., 2016; Cole et al., 
2015; Hassabis et al., 2007; Ramussen & Bernsten, 2016; Teddder et al., 2016).  
Finally, a fully developed model needs to combine both laterality and hierarchy. The field 
spent many decades framing the emotion question around the cerebral cortex, and around 
hemispheric asymmetry in particular. As we review in the Introduction, hemispheric 
asymmetry is an entirely appropriate question, but only in the context of some facets of 
emotion. Other facets, such as emotional experience or generation, are probably not cortical 
phenomena at all. In sum, we need a model that encompasses not only the left-right, but 
also the up-down dimensions of anatomy. This synthesis will be all the easier through work 
with non-human animals (Turnbull & Bar, 2020). As discussed above, some facets of 
emotion (such as core emotional experience, and even emotion memory) are clearly 
evolutionarily older, and distributed across subcortical areas. Other skills (such as emotion 
regulation) are evolutionarily newer and achieved by cortical brain regions. 
The neuropsychology of emotion is a field that has travelled an enormous journey in the last 
half-century. The study of emotions (as our opening Luria quote suggests) was often absent, 
or existed as an ‘after-thought’ chapter towards the end of a textbook, based on a modest 
number of papers, published by a few far-sighted specialists. However, the field was never 
destined to continue this way, because of the enormous importance of emotions in human 
mental life, and the critical way that disorders of emotion and their management lie at the 
heart of mental illness. On this basis, we fully expect that the field will rapidly grow, in both 
size and influence, We especially hope that the field moves towards greater precision: to 





Abler, B., Hofer, C., & Viviani, R. (2008). Habitual emotion regulation strategies and baseline 
brain perfusion. Neuroreport, 19(1), 21-24. 
Adolphs, R. (2007). Investigating Human Emotion with lesions and Intracraneal recordings. 
In J. Allen & J. Coan (eds.) Handbook of Emotion Elicitation Assessment, 426-439. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. (1994). Impaired recognition of emotion 
in facial expressions following bilateral damage to the human 
amygdala. Nature, 372(6507), 669-672. 
Anderson MC & Green C. Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. Nature, 
410: 366-369, 2001 
Bandler R. & Shipley, MT. Columnar organization in the midbrain periaqueductal gray. 
Trends in Neurosciences. 17: 379-389, 1994. 
Beer, J. S., & Lombardo, M. V. (2007). Insights into emotion regulation from 
neuropsychology. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 69–86). 
New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Ben-Yishay, Y., & Diller, L. (2011). Handbook of holistic neuropsychological rehabilitation: 
outpatient rehabilitation of traumatic brain injury. Oxford University Press. 
Bertossi, E., Tesini, C., Cappelli, A., & Ciaramelli, E. (2016). Ventromedial prefrontal damage 
causes a pervasive impairment of episodic memory and future 
thinking. Neuropsychologia, 90, 12-24. 
Bisiach, E & Geminiani, G. (1991). Anosognosia relating to hemiplegia and hemianopia. In 
Prigatano GP and Schacter DL. Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury: Clinical and 
theoretical issues. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.17-39. 
Bisiach, E, Vallar, G, Perani, D, Papagno, C and Berti, A. (1986). Unawareness of disease 
following lesions of the right hemisphere: Anosognosia for hemiplegia and 
anosognosia for hemianopia. Neuropsychologia, 24: 471-482,. 
Blakemore, SJ, Wolpert, DM and Frith, CD. (2002). Abnormailities in the awareness  of 
action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6: 237-242,  
Borod J.C. (2000) The Neuropsychology of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Borod, J. C., Bloom, R. L., Brickman, A. M., Nakhutina, L., & Curko, E. A. (2002). Emotional 
processing deficits in individuals with unilateral brain damage. Applied 
Neuropsychology, 9(1), 23-36. 
Brier, JI, Adair, JC, Gold, M, Fennell, EB, Gilmore, RL and Heilman, KM. (1995). 
Dissociation of anosognosia for hemiplegia and aphasia during left-hemisphere 
anesthesia. Neurology, 45: 65-67.  
Bryden MP, Free T, Gange S & Groff P. (1991). Handedness effects in the detection of 
dichotically-presented words and emotions. Cortex, 27: 229-235. 
BUB, D.N. Methodological issues confronting PET and fMRI studies of cognitive function. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 17: 467-484, 2000.  
Bush, G., Luu, P., and Posner, M.I. (2000).  Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior 
cingulate cortex.  Trends in Cognitive Science, 4(6), 215-222 
Calder, AJ, Lawrence, AD and Young, AW. (2001). Neuropsychology of fear and loathing. 
Nature Neuroscience, 2: 352-363. 
Cappa, S, Sterzi, R, Vallar, G and Bisiach, E. (1987). Remission of hemineglect during 
vestibular stimulation. Neuropsychologia, 25: 775-782. 
Cloninger, CR. Temperament and personality. Current Biology, 4: 266-273, 1994. 
Compton, R. J. (2000). Ability to disengage attention predicts negative affect. Cognition & 
Emotion, 14(3), 401-415. 
Cole, S. N., Morrison, C. M., Barak, O., Pauly‐Takacs, K., & Conway, M. A. (2016). Amnesia 
and future thinking: Exploring the role of memory in the quantity and quality of episodic 
future thoughts. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 55(2), 206-224. 
Critchley, M. (1974). Misoplegia, or hatred of hemiplegia.  Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine, 
41: 82-87,  
Craig, A.D.B. (2011). Significance of the insula for the evolution of human awareness of 
feelings from the body. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1225, 72–82. 
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. London: 
Papermac,. 
 
Damasio, AR. (1996). The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the 
prefrontal cortex. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London (Biology) 
351:1413-1420. 
Damasio, AR. (1999).The feeling of what happens: Body, emotion and the making of 
consciousness. London: William Heinemann. 
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: evolutionary and 
neurobiological origins. Nature reviews neuroscience, 14(2), 143-152. 
Damasio, A., Damasio, H., & Tranel, D. (2012). Persistence of feeling and sentience after 
bilateral damage of the insula. Cerebral Cortex. 23 (4): 833–846. 
Damasio, H, Grabowski, T, Bechara, A, Damasio, H, Ponto, LLB, Parvisi, J and Hichawa, 
RD. (2000). Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of self-generated 
emotions. Nature Neuroscience, 3: 1049-1056.  
Daprati,  E, Sirigu, A, Pradat-Diehl, P,  Franck, N and Jeannerod, M. (2000). Recognition of 
Self-produced Movement in a Case of Severe Neglect. Neurocase, 6: 477-486,. 
Davidson, RJ. (2001). Towards a biology of personality and emotion. Annals of the New 
York Acadamy of Science. 935: 191-207. 
Davidson, RJ and Irwin, W. (1999). The functional neuronatomy of emotion and affective 
style. Trends in Cognitive Science, 3: 11-21,. 
Davis, KL & Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience: Multi-Dimensional Inventory. 
Greesboro: Pegasus International, 
Davis, KL, Panksepp, J & Normansell, L. (2003). The Affective Neuroscience Personality 
Scales: Normative Data and Implications. Neuropsychoanalysis, 5: 57-69.  
DePaulis, A and Bandler, R. (1991).The Midbrain Periaqueductal Gray Matter:  Functional 
Anatomical and Neurochemical Organization.  New York: Plenum Press.  
Fedoroff, JP, Starkstein, SE, & Forrester, AW. (1992). Depression in patients with acute 
traumatic injury.  American Journal of Psychiatry, 149, 918-923.  
Feinstein, J. S. (2013). Lesion studies of human emotion and feeling. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 23(3), 304-309. 
Feinstein, J. S., Adolphs, R., Damasio, A., & Tranel, D. (2011). The human amygdala and 
the induction and experience of fear. Current biology, 21(1), 34-38. 
Feinstein, J. S., Rudrauf, D., Khalsa, S. S., Cassell, M. D., Bruss, J., Grabowski, T. J., & 
Tranel, D. (2010). Bilateral limbic system destruction in man. Journal of clinical and 
experimental neuropsychology, 32(1), 88-106. 
Fifer WP & Moon CM. (1994). The role of the mother's voice in the organisation of brain 
functions in the newborn. Acta Paediatrica Suppl., 397: 86-93. 
Glanville BB, Levenson R & Best CT. (1977). A cardiac measure of cerebral asymmetries in 
infant auditory perception. Developmental Psychology, 13: 54-59. 
Feinberg, TE. (1997). Anosognosia and confabulation. In TE Feinberg and MJ Farah (eds.). 
Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychology. New York: McGraw Hill, pp.369-390,. 
Feinberg, T. E. (2011). Neuropathologies of the self: clinical and anatomical 
features. Consciousness and Cognition, 20(1), 75-81. 
Feinstein, J. S., Adolphs, R., Damasio, A., & Tranel, D. (2011). The human amygdala and 
the induction and experience of fear. Current biology, 21(1), 34-38. 
Fink, GR, Marshall, JC, Halligan, PW, Frith, CD, Driver, J, Frackowiack, RSJ and Dolan, RJ. 
The neural consequences of conflict between intention and the senses. Brain, 122: 
497-512, 1999. 
Frith, CD, Blakemore, S-J and Wolpert, DM. (2000). Abnormailities in the awareness and 
control of action. Philiosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London  (Series 
B: Biology), 355: 1771-1788,. 
Fotopoulou , A. , Conway , M.A. , Griffiths , P. , Birchall , D. , and Tyrer , S. ( 2007a). Self-
enhancing confabulation: revisiting the motivational hypothesis . Neurocase , 13 , 6 – 
15. 
Fotopoulou , A. , Conway , M.A. , and Solms , M. (2007b). Confabulation: motivated reality 
monitoring. Neuropsychologia , 45 , 2180 – 2190 . 
Gainotti, G. (1972). Emotional behaviour and hemispheric side of lesion. Cortex, 8: 41-55. 
Gainotti, G. (1975). Confabulation of denial in senile dementia. Psychiatric Clinic (Basel), 8: 
99-108. 
Gainotti, G. Emotional disorders in relation to unilateral brain damage. In Feinberg, T.E. and 
Farah, M.J. Behavioural neurology and neuropsychology. New York: McGraw Hill, 
1997, pp.369-390. 
Giuliani, N. R., Drabant, E. M., Bhatnagar, R., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Emotion regulation and 
brain plasticity: expressive suppression use predicts anterior insula 
volume. Neuroimage, 58(1), 10-15. 
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion 
regulation: reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological 
psychiatry, 63(6), 577-586. 
Goldstein, K. (1939). The organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from 
Pathological Data in Man. New York: American Book Company.  
Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion regulation: Conceptual and empirical foundations. In J. J. Gross 
(Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 3–20). New York, NY: Guilford Press.  
Gross, J. J., & Jazaieri, H. (2014). Emotion, emotion regulation, and psychopathology: An 
affective science perspective. Clinical Psychological Science, 2(4), 387-401. 
Gross, J., & Thompson, R. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (Vol. 50, pp. 3–24). New York, NY: 
Guilford Press.  
Harlow, J. M. (1848). Passage of an iron rod through the head. Boston Med Surg J., 39, 389-
393. 
Harlow, J. M. (1868). Recovery from the passage of an iron bar through the head. 
Publications of the Massachusetts Medical Society, 2, 327–347.  
Halligan, PW, Marshall, JC and Wade, DT. Unilateral somatoparaphrenia after right 
hemisphere stroke: A case description. Cortex, 31: 173-182, 1995. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 104, 1726–1731. http://dx.doi 
.org/10.1073/pnas.0610561104  
 
Heilman, KM, Barrett, AM & Adair, JC. (1998). Possible mechanisms of anosognosia: A 
deficit in self-awareness. Philiosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London 
(Series B: Biology), 353: 1903-1909,. 
Heilman, KM, Watson, RT & Valenstein, E. (2003). Neglect and related disorders. In KM 
Heilman and E Valenstein. Clinical Neuropsychology. New York, Oxford University 
Press, pp.296-346,  
Hermann, A., Bieber, A., Keck, T., Vaitl, D., & Stark, R. (2014). Brain structural basis of 
cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 9(9), 1435-1442. 
Herrero JV & Hillix WA (1990). Hemispheric performance in detecting prosody: A competitive 
dichotic listening task. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 71: 479-486. 
Hobel, BG Neuroscience and appetitive behaviour research: 25 years. Appetite, 29: 119-
133, 1997.  
House, A, Dennis, M, Warlow, C, Hawton, K & Molyneux, A. (1990). Mood disorders after 
stroke and their relation to lesion location. Brain, 113: 1113-1129,. 
House, A and Hodges, J. (1988). Persistent denial of handicap after infarction of the right 
basal ganglia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 51: 112-115.  
Huston, J.P.; Borbely, A.A. (1973). Operant conditioning in forebrain ablated rats by use of 
rewarding hypothalamic stimulation. Brain Res., 50, 467–472. 
Huston, J.P.; Borbely, A.A. (1974). The thalamic rat: General behavior, operant learning with 
rewarding hypothalamic stimulation, and effects of amphetamine. Physiol. Behav., 12, 
433–448. 
Ikemoto, S and Panksepp, J. (1999). The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in 
motovated behaviour: A unifying interpretation with special reference to reward 
seeking. Brain Research Reviews, 31: 6-41.  
Jackson, J. H. (1888). Remarks on the diagnosis and treatment of diseases of the brain. 
British Medical Journal, 2, 111–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.2 .1438.111  
Kanske, P., Heissler, J., Schönfelder, S., Bongers, A., & Wessa, M. (2011). How to regulate 
emotion? Neural networks for reappraisal and distraction. Cerebral Cortex, 21(6), 
1379-1388 
Kaplan-Solms, KL and Solms, M. (2000). Clinical Studies in Neuropsychoanalysis: 
Introduction of a Depth Neuropsychology. London: Karnac Books. 
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: The 
effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient’s ability to remember the past 
and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20, 353–379. http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125  
Kring, A. M., & Sloan, D. M. (Eds.). (2009). Emotion regulation and psychopathology: A 
transdiagnostic approach to etiology and treatment. Guilford Press. 
Klonoff, P. S. (2010). Psychotherapy after brain injury: Principles and techniques. Guilford 
Press. 
Kühn, S., Gallinat, J., & Brass, M. (2011). “Keep calm and carry on”: Structural correlates of 
expressive suppression of emotions. PloS one, 6(1), e16569. 
Leclercq, M., Deloche, G., & Rousseaux, M. (2002). Attentional complaints evoked by 
traumatic brain- injured and stroke patients: Frequency and importance. In M. Leclercq 
& P. Zimmermann (Eds.), Applied neuropsychology of attention: Theory, diagnosis and 
rehabilitation (pp. 89–109). London, UK: Psychology Press. 
Le Doux, J. (1996). The Emotional Brain. New York: Touchstone.  
LeDoux, J. (2003). The emotional brain, fear, and the amygdala. Cellular Molecular 
Neurobiology, 23(4/5):727–738.  
Livingstone, K. M., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2015). Situation selection and modification for 
emotion regulation in younger and older adults. Social psychological and personality 
science, 6(8), 904-910. 
Lucas MD, Turnbull OH & Kaplan-Solms KL. (1993). Laterality of cradling in relation to 
perception and expression of facial affect. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 154 (3): 
347-352. 
Lu LH, Barrett, AM, Schwartz, MD, Cibula, JE, Gilmore, RL, Uthman, BM and Heilman, KM. 
(1997). Anosognosia and confabulation during the Wada test. Neurology, 49: 1316-
1332. 
Luria, AR (1973). The Working Brain: An Introduction to Neuropsychology. New York: Basic 
Books 
 
Luria, A. R. (1966). Higher Cortical Functions in Man. Basic Books: New York. 
McRae, K., Ciesielski, B., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Unpacking cognitive reappraisal: Goals, 
tactics, and outcomes. Emotion, 12, 250–255.  
Marcel, A.J., Tegner, R. & Nimmo-Smith, I. (2004). Anosognosia for plegia: Specificity, 
extension, partiality and disunity of bodily unawareness. Cortex, 40 (1) 19-40.  
Markovitch, N., Netzer, L., & Tamir, M. (2017). What you like is what you try to get: Attitudes 
toward emotions and situation selection. Emotion, 17(4), 728. 
Merker, B. (2007). Consciousness without a cerebral cortex. Consciousness Transitions, 
193-230. 
McGlynn, SM and Schacter, DL. (1989). Unawreness of deficits in neuropsychological 
syndromes. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 11: 143-205.  
McRae, K., Misra, S., Prasad, A. K., Pereira, S. C., & Gross, J. J. (2012). Bottom-up and top-
down emotion generation: implications for emotion regulation. Social cognitive and 
affective neuroscience, 7(3), 253-262. 
Meador, KJ, Loring, DW, Feinberg, TE, Lee, GP and Nichols, ME. (2000). Anosognosia and 
asomatognosia during intracarotid amobarbital inactivation. Neurology, 55: 816-820.  
Moss, AD and Turnbull, OH. (1996). Hatred of the hemiparetic limbs (misoplegia) in a 10 
year-old child. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 61(2): 210-211.  
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2007). The neural architecture of emotion regulation. In J. 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 87– 109). New York, NY: Guildford 
Press.  
Ohira, H., Nomura, M., Ichikawa, N., Isowa, T., Iidaka, T., Sato, A. & Yamada, J. (2006). 
Association of neural and physiological responses during voluntary emotion 
suppression. Neuroimage, 29(3), 721-733. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal 
emotions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Parvizi, J.; Damasio, A.R. Neuroanatomical correlates of brainstem coma. Brain 2003, 126, 
1524–1536. 
Phan, KL, Wagner, T, Taylor, SF and Liberzon, I. (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of 
emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI. NeuroImage, 
16: 331-348,. 
Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (2000). Developing mechanisms of self-
regulation. Development and psychopathology, 12(3), 427-441. 
Prigatano, G. P. (1999). Principles of neuropsychological rehabilitation. Oxford University 
Press. 
Prigatano, GP and Schacter, DL. (1991). Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury: Clinical and 
theoretical issues. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Prigatano GP, Weinstein, EA and Edwin, A. (1996). Weistein’s contributions to 
neuropsychological rehabilitation. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 6: 305-326.  
Ramachandran, VS. (1994). Phantom limbs, neglect syndromes, repressed memories, and 
Freudian Psychology. International Review of Neurobiology, 37: 291-333. 
Ramachandran, VS. (1996). What neurological syndromes can tell us about human nature: 
Some lessons from phantom limbs, Capgras syndrome, and anosognosia. Cold 
Harbour Symposia on Qualtitative Biology, 61: 115-134. 
Ramachandran, VS and Blakslee, S. (1998). Phantoms in the Brain: Human Nature and the 
Architecture of the Mind. London: Fourth Estate. 
Rasmussen, K. W., & Berntsen, D. (2018). Deficits in remembering the past and imagining 
the future in patients with prefrontal lesions. Journal of neuropsychology, 12(1), 78-
100. 
Reitan, RM. (1972). Verbal problem solving as related to cerebral damage. Perceptual and 
Motor Skills, 34: 515-524,  
Robbins, TW and Everitt, BJ. (1992). Functions of dopamine in the dorsal and ventral 
striatum. Seminars in the Neurosciences, 4: 119-128.  
Robinson, RG and Jorge, R. (2000).  Mood disorders.  In: M.D. Vani Rao, and C. Lyketsos 
Neuropsychiatric sequelae of traumatic brain injury.  Psychosomatics, 41, 95-103, 
1994 
Rode, G, Perenin, MT, Honore, J and Boisson, D. (1998). Improvement of the motor deficit 
of neglect patients through vestibular stimulation: Evidence for a motor neglect 
component. Cortex, 34: 253-261.  
Ross, ED & Rush, AJ. (1981). Diagnosis and neuroanatomical correlates of depression in 
brain damaged patients. Archives of General Psychiatry, 38: 1344-1354.  
Rothbart, M. K., Ziaie, H., & O'boyle, C. G. (1992). Self regulation and emotion in infancy. 
New directions for child and adolescent development, 1992(55), 7-23. 
Rolls, ET. (1999). The Brain and Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Salas, C.E., Gross, J., Rafal, R., Viñas-Guasch, N. & Turnbull, O.H. (2013). Concrete 
behaviour and reappraisal deficits after a left frontal stroke: A case study. 
Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 23: 467–500. 
Salas, C.E., Vaughan, F.L., Shanker, S., & Turnbull, O.H. (2013). Stuck in a moment: 
Concreteness and psychotherapy after acquired brain injury. Journal of Neurodisability 
and Psychotherapy, 1: 1-38 
Salas, C.E.; Radovic, D.; Yuen, K.; Yeates, G.N.; Castro, O. & Turnbull, O.H. (2014). 
‘Opening an emotional dimension in me’. Changes in emotional reactivity and emotion 
regulation in a case of executive impairment after left fronto-parietal damage. Bulletin 
of the Menninger Clinic, 78 (4): 301-334 
Salas, C. E., Casassus, M., & Turnbull, O. H. (2017). A neuropsychoanalytic approach to 
case studies. Clinical Social Work Journal, 45(3), 201-214. 
Salas, C.E., Castro, O., Yuen, K.S., Radovic, D., d’Avossa, G. & Turnbull, O.H. (2016). ‘I just 
can’t hide it’: A behavioural and lesion study on emotional response modulation after 
right prefrontal damage. Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience: 1-13. doi: 
10.1093/scan/nsw075 
Salas, C. E., Gross, J. J., & Turnbull, O. H. (2019). Using the process model to understand 
emotion regulation changes after brain injury. Psychology and 
Neuroscience. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pne0000174 
Salas, C.E.; Castro, O., Radovic, D., Gross, J.J. & Turnbull, O.H. (2018). The Role of Inner 
Speech in Emotion Dysregulation and Emotion Regulation Strategy Use. Revista 
Latinoamericana de Psicología: 50(2), 79-88.  
Salas, C.E., Casassus, M. & Turnbull, O.H. (2016). A Neuropsychoanalytic Approach to 
Case Studies. Clinical Social Work. 1-14. doi: 10.1007/s10615-016-0596-z 
Salas, C.E., Gross, J. & Turnbull, O.H. (2014). Reappraisal generation after acquired brain 
damage: The role of laterality and cognitive control. Frontiers in Emotion Science, 5 
(242): 1-9. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00242  
Salas, C.E.; Radovic, D.; Castro, O. & Turnbull, O.H. (2015). Internally and externally 
generated emotions in people with acquired brain injury: A brief report on right 
hemisphere damage. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 1-9 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00101 
Salas, C. E., Radovic, D., Yuen, K. S., Yeates, G. N., Castro, O., & Turnbull, O. H. (2014). 
“Opening an emotional dimension in me”: Changes in emotional reactivity and emotion 
regulation in a case of executive impairment after left fronto-parietal damage. Bulletin 
of the Menninger Clinic, 78(4), 301-334. 
Salas, C. E., Vaughan, F., Shanker, S., & Turnbull, O. H. (2013). Stuck in a moment, 
Concreteness and psychotherapy after acquired brain injury. Journal of Neuro-
disability & Psychotherapy, 1(1), 1-38. 
Sands, M., & Isaacowitz, D. M. (2017). Situation selection across adulthood: The role of 
arousal. Cognition and Emotion, 31(4), 791-798. 
Schilder, P. (1935). The Image and Appearance of the Human Body. London: Kegan and 
Co. 
Schultz, W. (2001). Multiple reward signals in the brain. Nature Neuroscience, 1: 199-207. 
Sheppes, G., Suri, G., & Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion regulation and 
psychopathology. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 11, 379-405. 
Shipley-Brown F, Dingwall WO, Berlin CI, Yeni-Komshian G & Gordon-Salant S (1988). 
Hemispheric processing of affective and linguistic intonation contours in normal 
subjects. Brain and Language, 33: 16-26. 
Sirigu, A, Daprati, E, Pradat-Diehl, P, Franck, N & Jeannerrod, M. (1999). Perception of self-
generated movement following left parietal lesion. Brain, 122: 1867-1874.  
Solms, M, Turnbull, OH, Kaplan-Solms, K & Miller, P. (1998). Rotated drawing: The range of 
performance, and anatomical correlates, in a series of 16 patients. Brain and 
Cognition, 38: 358-368.  
Solms, M. (2013). The Conscious Id. Neuropsychoanalysis, 15(1), 5-19. 
Starkstein, SE, Berthier, ML, Fedoroff, P, Price, TR & Robinson, RG. (1990). Anosognosia 
and major depression in two patients with cerebrovascular lesions.  Neurology, 40: 
1380-1382.  
Starkstein SE, Boston, JD and Robinson, RG. (1988). Mechanisms of mania after brain 
injury.  Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease,176: 87-99.  
Stuss, D. T., & Alexander, M. P. (2007). Is there a dysexecutive syndrome? Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362(1481), 901-915. 
Tedder, J., Miller, L., Tu, S., Hornberger, M., & Lah, S. (2016). Into the future with little past: 
exploring mental time travel in a patient with damage to the mammillary 
bodies/fornix. The Clinical Neuropsychologist, 30(2), 334-349. 
Thompson, R. A. (2011). Emotion and emotion regulation: Two sides of the developing 
coin. Emotion Review, 3(1), 53-61. 
Turnbull, O.H. & Bar, A. (2020). Animal minds: The case for emotion, based on 
neuroscience. Neuropsychoanalysis, doi:10.1080/15294145.2020.1848611 
Turnbull OH & Lucas, MD (1996). Is the lateral cradling preference related to lateral 
asymmetries in attention? Journal of Genetic Psychology, 157: 161-167. 
Turnbull, O.H., Rhys-Jones, S. & Jackson, L. (2001). The leftward cradling bias and prosody: 
An investigation of cradling preferences in the deaf community. Journal of Genetic 
Psychology, 162: 178-186.  
Turnbull, OH, Beschin, N and Della Sala, S. (1997a). Agnosia for object orientation: 
Implications for theories of object recognition. Neuropsychologia, 35: 153-163,. 
Turnbull, OH, Carey, DP and McCarthy, RA. (1997b). The neuropsychology of object 
constancy. Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society, 3: 288-298.  
Turnbull,  OH, Jones, K and Reed-Screen, J. (2002). Implicit awareness of deficit in 
anosognosia: An emotion-based account of denial of deficit. Neuropsychoanalysis, 4: 
69-86.  
Turnbull, OH, Bowman, C.H., Shanker, S. & Davies, J.L. (2014). Emotion-based learning: 
Insights from the Iowa Gambling Task. Frontiers of Psychology, 5 (Article 162): 1-11. 
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00162.  
Turnbull, O.H., Lovett, V.E., Chaldecott, , J. & Lucas, M. (2014). Reports of intimate touch: 
Erogenous zones and somatosensory cortical organization. Cortex, 53: 146-154. doi: 
10.1016/j.cortex.2013.07.010.  
Turnbull, O.H., Owen, V. & Evans, C.E.Y. (2005). Negative emotions in anosognosia. 
Cortex, 41: 67-75. 
Turnbull, O.H. & Salas, C.E. (2017). Confabulation: Developing the ‘emotion dysregulation’ 
hypothesis. Cortex, 87: 52-61. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2016.09.024. 
Turnbull, O.H. Fotopoulou, A. & Solms, M. (2014). Anosognosia as motivated unawareness: 
The ‘defence’ hypothesis revisited. Cortex, 61: 18-29. 
Urry, H. L., & Gross, J. J. (2010). Emotion regulation in older age. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 19(6), 352-357. 
Vallar, G, Sterzi, R, Bottini, G, Cappa, S and Rusconi, ML. (1990). Temporary remission of 
left hemianesthesia after vestibular stimulation. Cortex, 26: 123-131.  
Walsh, KW. (1985). Understanding Brain Damage: A Primer of Neuropsychological 
Evaluation. Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone.  
Webb, T. L., Lindquist, K. A., Jones, K., Avishai, A., & Sheeran, P. (2018). Situation 
selection is a particularly effective emotion regulation strategy for people who need 
help regulating their emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 32(2), 231-248. 
Weinstein, EA. (1991). Anosognosia and denial of illness. In G.P. Prigatano and D.L. 
Schacter. Awareness of Deficit after Brain Injury. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Weinstein, EA. (1996). Symbolic aspects of confabulation following brain damage: Influence 
of premorbid personality. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic; 60: 331-350. 
Weinstein, EA & Kahn, RL. (1953). Personality factors in denial of illness. American Medical 
Association Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 69: 355-367.  
Weinstein, EA & Kahn, RL. (1955). Denial of illness: Symbolic and physiological aspects. 
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas.  
Woods, D. L., & Knight, R. T. (1986). Electrophysiologic evidence of increased distractibility 
after dorsolateral prefrontal lesions. Neurology, 36, 212–216. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1212/WNL.36.2.212  
Zetsche, U., Bürkner, P. C., & Schulze, L. (2018). Shedding light on the association between 
repetitive negative thinking and deficits in cognitive control–A meta-analysis. Clinical 
Psychology Review, 63, 56-65. 
